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Abstract 
The resolution of problems with lease renewals in Fiji, particularly in the sugarcane districts, 
has ramifications for private investment and growth in the entire economy.  The impending 
withdrawal of subsidies to sugar as world trade is liberalised has increased the urgency of 
finding solutions to these problems.  This paper draws on game theory to characterise the 
problems facing the Fiji sugar industry.  The incentives for land and ethnic politics are 
identified.  Separate proposals are put forward to facilitate secure access to land and to 
minimise adjustment costs from the erosion of preferences under the Sugar Protocol.  The 
rationalisation forced upon the sugar industry, if managed well, could induce land reforms 
that could improve the investment climate and the prospects for growth, whilst minimising 
pains of adjustment.   
                                                 
*Helpful comments from Ron Duncan, Martin Dihm, Azmat Gani, Helen Hughes, Theo Levantis, Paresh 
Narayan, Biman Prasad, Mahen Reddy, and Ben Reilly on an earlier draft of this paper is gratefully 
acknowledged though views expressed here are those of the author alone. 
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1. Introduction 
The stresses facing the Fijian sugar industry from the expiry of land leases for many 
smallholder farmers and the erosion of trade preferences in the EU have been raised by 
several commentators (see Reddy and Yanagida, 1998; Levantis, Jotzo, and Tulpule, 2003; 
Prasad and Narayan, 2004).  Tenants knew some thirty years in advance of the exact date 
when their leases were going to expire, but were shocked when eviction notices did eventuate.  
The withdrawal of subsidies to sugar from the EU was imminent since 1986 when agriculture 
was first brought within the ambit of GATT and particularly since December 1994 following 
the commitment by the EU to limit the value of export subsidies (and the volume of 
subsidised sugar exports from the EU) at the conclusion of the Uruguay round. 
 
Preferential access for Fiji sugar into the United Kingdom and subsequently into the EU (after 
UK joined the EEC in 1974) has existed since the industry was first established in 1879 with 
Indian labour.  Some 60,000 workers, brought in under the indenture scheme from India that 
lasted to 1916, subsequently formed the smallholder sector growing sugarcane on land leased 
from the indigenous population.  Preferential access into the EU is provided for under the 
Sugar Protocol that took effect on 28 February 1975.  The Protocol states that:  
“the [European] Community undertakes for an indefinite period to purchase and import, at 
guaranteed prices, specific quantities of cane sugar, raw or white, which originate in the ACP 
states and which these States undertake to deliver to it”  Article 1 of the ACP/EU Sugar 
Protocol 
Prices, according to the Protocol, is to be negotiated annually though in practice the price paid 
to the ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) states is equal to that paid to EU producers.  In 
its 1995 review of the sugar policy, the EU had clearly stated its intention to comply with its 
Uruguay Round commitments of “substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support 
and protection”1.  The impetus for withdrawal of EU sugar-subsidies, moreover, may have 
                                                 
1 This was Punta del Este Declaration of ministers of trade made in September 1986 (quoted from 
http://www.acpsugar.org/eusugar1995review.htm, accessed on 18 October 2004). 
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been hastened by disputes registered by Australia, Brazil and Thailand with the WTO. 2  The 
Cotonou Agreement lapses at the end of 2007, at which time the EU subsidies in the form of 
preferential prices for sugar imports will fall further. 
 
I argue here that the tenants were shocked on non-renewal of their leases because of 
expectations that leases would be renewed.  The political leadership was responsible for 
raising these expectations.  Landowners, in contrast, have unrealistically high expectations of 
the profitability of sugarcane farming, thus have been lured into sugar cane farming with 
consequent eviction of tenants.  Communal politics in the presence of rents in the form of 
sugar-subsidies have encouraged inter-ethnic rent-dissipating competition.  Electoral support 
in an ethnically segmented population has been maximised through creation of discontent on 
the sharing of sugar proceeds between the growers (majority of whom are ethnic Indians) and 
landowners (majority of whom are indigenous).  The availability of rents and opaque property 
rights provide fertile grounds for socially unproductive rent-seeking activity (see Bhagwati, 
1982 on ‘directly unproductive profit seeking activities’).  The loss of preferences to sugar 
(and greater transparency in decision-making), therefore, will reduce rent seeking.   
 
This paper draws on a simple game theoretic framework to analyse the problems faced by the 
smallholder sugarcane-growing sector.  The model’s predictions are consistent with the facts, 
thus allowing me to draw policy recommendations for facilitating access to land and easing 
adjustment to declining preferences.  To conclude: the challenges of facilitating secure access 
to land should be considered separately from the challenges of facilitating adjustment to the 
withdrawal of subsidies to Fijian sugar.  To achieve the former, the Native Land Trust Board 
(NLTB) should be ‘unbundled’ into two separate components: a regulator of the market for 
                                                 
2 These are registered as DS265, DS266, and DS286, respectively.  The WTO is reported to have ruled against 
the subsidies and the EU has announced its intentions to appeal this decision (reported by Economic News, 
http://economy.news.designerz.com/wto-rules-against-eu-sugar-subsidies-bloc-to-appeal.html accessed on 18 
November 2004).  
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secure access to land and a competitive component responsible for land-intermediation.  
Adjustments to the withdrawal of sugar subsidies could be facilitated by ‘decoupling’ the 
subsidy implicit in locally produced sugar and using this as redundancy payments to farmers 
(and mill-workers) choosing to opt out of the industry.  An illustrative example is used to 
show that such a process could increase the incomes of the farmers whilst reducing 
inefficiencies within the industry. 
 
2. A synopsis of the sugar sector 
Sugar is a large sector of the Fiji economy, contributing some 7 percent of GDP, 22 percent of 
total exports, and providing the livelihoods of nearly a quarter of the total population (Prasad 
and Narayan, 2004).3  Exports into the EU receive prices that are from 2 to 4 times the world 
market price.4  There is little doubt that the preferences will fall over time, possibly in a 
stepwise fashion.  The first of these reductions, of 30 percent, is due to occur at the end of 
2007; the complete erosion of the subsidy could happen within a decade.  The abolition of the 
preferential price arrangement is imminent given EU’s commitment to abiding by the WTO-
process.  The lapse of the subsidy, unless if prepared for well in advance, will create serious 
pains of adjustment that are likely to flow to the rest of the economy.  The incentives for 
managing the adjustment process are strong.  The Economic Partnership Arrangements of the 
EU, moreover, contain measure to support adjustments to liberal trade as per WTO-
commitments (European Commission, 2002).   
 
The smallholder sector, which supplies all of the sugarcane, comprises some 21,000 farmers 
with supply-contracts to the Fiji Sugar Corporation.  The average farm size is 4.6 hectares 
producing around 160 tons of sugarcane (data from Fiji Post, 2002 and Kingi, 2004).  All of 
                                                 
3 The industry provides employment to around 51,000 people. 
4 As of 2004, the price paid for ACP exports of sugar to the EU was 600 Euros per ton, while the world market 
price was 250 Euros.  The total value of transfers via the subsidy, assuming that the EU agreed quota of 165,348 
and the 19,181 tons sold under the Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) (with the latter sold at a price that is 85 
percent of the guaranteed quota-price under the) quota is satisfied, will amount to nearly 64 million Euros.   
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the farms are rain fed and in a good year, total sugarcane production is approximately 4 
million tons.  The sugarcane is manually harvested by some 14,000 cutters who operate in 
small gangs, with the cane being transported to one of the four sugar mills operated by the Fiji 
Sugar Corporation (FSC).  Approximately equal quantities of cane is transported via the rail 
system operated by the FSC and on privately operated motor trucks (lorries); the latter have 
been increasing as sugarcane cultivation has expanded into areas without rail transport.  The 
mills are 68 percent owned by the government, and employ around 3,000 workers—some 
only during the half-yearly harvesting season.  Depending on milling efficiency and the 
volume of throughput, total sugar production has ranged from 264,000 (in 1975) to 517,000 
tons (in 1994) (annual production data is given in table 1).5  Most of the sugar produced is 
exported and some 80 percent of the exports are sold to the EU at a preferential price under 
the Sugar Protocol.  The price paid to the grower for the cane is determined by a formula that 
takes into account the average price received for the sugar produced.   
 
Seventy four percent of the farms are operated by Indo-Fijians with the vast majority of the 
farms on leased land.  Leases have been expiring since 1997 with some 1500 having expired 
in 2001 (see table 2).  The majority of the farms with expired leases have been taken over by 
the landowners, although a few are in the process of having their leases renewed.  The area 
under sugarcane cultivation has been falling.  In an attempt to stem this decline in sugarcane 
production, the government has been providing a grant of $10,000 to each landowner taking 
up sugarcane farming.  Many of the new landowner farmers have high expectations of the 
returns from sugarcane farming.  Farmers enticed into the industry with public-handouts will 
likely resist the withdrawal of subsidies when they do eventuate, and thus could become a 
                                                 
5 By international standards, Fiji is a high cost producer.  Cane output in Fiji of around 50 tons per hectare 
compares unfavourably with Australian production at 120 tons per hectare. The Prime Minister, moreover, has 
stated that cane yield per hector in Fiji is the second lowest and sugar yield the worst amongst the 20 African, 
Caribean, and Pacific (ACP) sugar-producing states (FijiSUN, October 6).  The cost of producing a ton of sugar 
at the four mills, according to the Prime Minister, in Fiji dollars are 340, 320, 230, and 160 at the Penang, 
Lautoka, Labasa, and Rarawai mills, respectively. 
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strong lobby for domestic subsidies when the externally funded price support is withdrawn.  
Such subsidies would create their own set of political interests and ensuing problems. 
 
3. Incentives for land (& ethnic) politics 
Indigenous Fijians own some 87 percent of total land; the State holds another 6 percent, with 
the remainder being held under freehold title (Prasad, 2004).  The NLTB, established by the 
Native Land Trust Ordinance of 1940, has the authority to administer all land held in native 
title "for the benefit of Fijian Owners".6  The NLTB makes general policies regarding 
administration of native land, approval of leases, collection and distribution of proceeds from 
rental of land, and in building landlord-tenant relations.  The NLTB, at its inception, had been 
remarkably successful in facilitating access to under-utilised land.  Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, the 
architect of the scheme, had convinced landowners to release land for farming for the benefit 
of the nation as well as to farmers and the landowners.  He argued to the 1936 Council of 
Chiefs that “it is our duty to use our influence, our power, to open up waste Matagali land for 
agricultural purposes; whether they be taken up by Europeans, Indians, or Fijians” (quoted in 
Ward, 1995: 243).  The scheme delivered gains from exchange and was based on trust 
between the lessees and lessors.7  NLTB has a monopoly, granted via legislation, on issue and 
administration of leases.8  This position has lent itself to abuse over time.  Ward (1995: 247) 
for example suggested that the NLTB effectively dispossesses the owners of their land, while 
Vesikula (2002) noted that the distribution of rental income is a cause of considerable conflict 
within the landowning clan.   
 
                                                 
6 Information on the NLTB sourced from http://www.nltb.com.fj/history.html, accessed on 17/09/2004. 
7 Such cooperation was possible under a statesman like Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna and perhaps assisted via a strong 
colonial regime that under-wrote all formal contracts.  Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna had no illusions about the 
challenges facing land intermediation, pointing out to the chiefs in his address to the Council of Chiefs in 1933 
that: “We regard the Indian desire for more permanent tenancy as a natural and legitimate consequence of an 
agricultural community settling in any country. But how was this desire to be reconciled with the need to protect 
the interests of present and future Fijian landowners?” (as quoted in NLTB, 2004). 
8 Land rents are set at a maximum of 6 percent of unimproved capital value; the NLTB retains 25 percent of the 
rental proceeds to cover administrative costs, the holder(s) of the three upper-most chiefly title within the 
traditional hierarchy take another 22.5 percent, leaving the remaining 52.5 percent to be shared by the rest of the 
mataqali (Ward, 1995: 221). 
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The incentives for rent-seeking behaviour by the NLTB intensified over time as preference 
accorded to sugar increased and increasing population raised the pressure on land.  Political 
competition intensified following independence in 1970, thus land ownership offered itself as 
a convenient mechanism for mobilisation of the electorate.  Similar incentives for 
mobilisation of ethnic Indian voters were generated as a defensive response to the above.  The 
trust of landowners within NLTB also eroded over time as the institution itself became 
increasingly politicised.  Informal (vakavanua) arrangements emerged as the administrative 
burden and distrust of NLTB grew, but such arrangements have been unpopular for long-term 
crops such as sugarcane.  The lack of legislative legitimacy has made enforceability of 
contracts a problem.  However, the vakavanua arrangements have been popular, particularly 
in the Sigatoka valley, for short-term (seasonal) cash crops such maize, rice and tobacco.   
 
The sugar industry encompasses institutionalised groupings of landowners, growers, the 
miller, and the government.  The Sugar Industry Act of 1984 created the Sugar Commission 
of Fiji (charged with the responsibility for coordination between sections of the industry), the 
Sugar Industry Tribunal (to settle industrial disputes), the Sugar Cane Growers Council (as 
the representative of the growers), and Mill Area Committees (to organise harvesting).  The 
Fiji Sugar Corporation, the trade unions, the Fiji Sugar Marketing Company, and the Sugar 
Cane Research Station add yet another layer of organisational complexity.  Each of the three 
post-independence constitutions, moreover, allocates the majority of the seats in the National 
Parliament (that is, the House of Representatives) on communal lines; the 1997 Constitution, 
for example, in the 71 member parliament has 23 and 19 seats, respectively, reserved for 
indigenous Fijians and ethnic Indians.  One seat is reserved for Rotumans (that is, inhabitants 
of the island of Rotuma or registered as such) and another three reserved for people not 
belonging to the communal groupings identified above.  The landowners-tenant divide serves 
as a convenient instrument for mobilisation of voters for political support at national 
elections.   
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 The smallholder sector that produces sugarcane can be characterised as a perfectly 
competitive industry.  It has minimal barriers to entry and exit.  Rising population without job 
opportunities in the rest of the economy over the past three decades has led to the smallholder 
sector being the holding sector for the under-employed.  Supply of unskilled labour has not 
been a problem.  The competitive nature of the smallholder sector implies that all rents to the 
growers are dissipated.  First, the rent component of income for profitable farms such as those 
on alluvial plains close to the mills is capitalised; second, rising prices for sugarcane has led 
to an expansion of area under cultivation (see Figure 1) – mainly onto marginal land and/or to 
land further away from the mills so that rents have been lost to rising costs of production 
and/or transportation; and third, inefficiencies both in farming and milling.  The simple 
correlation between the (current) price of cane and the area under cultivation over the 1971 to 
1997 period (that is, before the lease renewals became a problem) is equal to 0.78.  Subsidies 
have thus been dissipated by expansion of sugarcane growing onto marginal land and/or into 
areas remote from the mills.   
 
Several surveys confirm that the majority of the farms make poor returns, with many 
continually in debt (Rao, 2003).  Milling inefficiency, represented by the ratio of tons of cane 
used to produce a ton of sugar, also increased with the price of sugar (see Figure 2).9  The 
elasticity of tons of cane used to produce a ton of sugar to the price for sugar for the 1971 to 
2002 period is 0.1.  This estimate that is robust to inclusion of area under cultivation to 
include the potential drop in cane quality with expansion of area under cultivation (see 
Appendix tables A1 to A3).10  The dissipation of subsidies in these ways, moreover, is not 
                                                 
9 Part of the rise in tcts is attributed to planting of varieties such as Mana that has low pure obtainable cane sugar 
and increased burning of cane during harvest; these in turn are due to cane being grown on marginal land with 
weeds being a major problem. Burning of cane increases at the end of the season when farmers rush to clear the 
standing crop from the fields.   
10 The estimate here is of a long-run elasticity; the short time series disallows use of an error correction form 
(ECM) to decipher short and long-run elasticities.  The diagnostics do not suggest serious problems with the 
preferred model, however. 
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peculiar to the Fiji sugar industry but is a common phenomenon across industries and 
countries (see Horstman and Markusen, 1986; Vousden, 1993; Chand, 1999). 
 
Figure 1: Expansion in area of sugarcane cultivation and price of cane (1971-2002) 
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Data Source: Current Economic Statistics Bulletin, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, (June 2003 & January, 1990) 
 
Figure 2: Milling efficiency and sugar price (1971-2002) 
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Data Source: Current Economic Statistics Bulletin, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, (June 2003 & January, 1990) 
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If rent-dissipation is indeed the case, then the withdrawal of the subsidy to sugar should see a 
shrinkage in area under sugarcane production - possibly to those close to the mills and onto 
alluvial plains suitable for mechanised cultivation and harvesting, but without a significant 
loss of income to those growers over the longer-term.  The short-term pains from such a shock 
are likely to be large and disproportionately felt by marginal land and land distant from the 
mills.  How these costs could be minimised is discussed in section 4 below. 
 
Landowners have been led to believe that the returns they have received are an unfairly low 
share of rents from sugarcane farming.  Kurer (2001: 1) notes that “[t]here is hardly a more 
universal complaint among Fijian landowners that they receive unfairly low rents from their 
land”.  Such a perception has been common in village discussions, particularly around the 
kava bowl.  It was given legitimacy via Davies and Gallimore (1999) when this study was 
publicised widely in the popular press.  The conclusion that if ‘just and fair’ rents had been 
paid over the previous 30 years then each Fijian household would have received an additional 
accumulated total of approximately F$15,000 was particularly noted.  The ‘exploitation’ of 
landowners gained currency in the lead-up to the coup of 2000 when some indigenous Fijian 
political leadership pursued it. 
 
Kurer (2001) in his detailed study confirms the competitive nature of the industry.  He shows 
that the average farmer earns an annual cash income, inclusive of the costs of labour, of 
F$862; this is in sharp contrast to the estimate of F$8,000 by Davies and Gallimore (1999).11  
Many commentators have repeatedly pointed out the low productivity of the sector, the 
prevalence of inefficient farming practices, and the unrealistic expectations landowners have 
of rewards from sugarcane farming (see Forsyth, 1995; Kurer, 2001; Rao, 2001).  Why then 
have indigenous leaders pursued the view of high returns from sugar cane farming?  There are 
                                                 
11 Davies and Gallimore reach this figure by multiplying the average price of cane of F$50 by the average farm 
production of 160 tons, ignoring the costs of all inputs (including land rents, harvest and transportation costs, 
etc). 
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strong political incentives for such misinformation.  Land serves as an extremely convenient 
instrument for mobilising the electorate on ethnic lines.  It forms the basis for ethnic politics; 
a process reinforced by the electoral system where the majority of the parliamentary seats are 
allocated on ethnic lines. 
 
The NLTB presents the landowners as a united front, thus providing a strong incentive for 
tenants to unite in an adversarial environment.  The Growers Union, thus, earns its legitimacy 
only as a defender of the interests of the tenants, the majority of whom are ethnic Indians.  
This can be thought of as a capitalist (landowner) and labour (tenant) divide, but reinforced by 
an electoral system that allocates seats in parliament on the basis of ethnicity.  In this context, 
aspiring leaders have an incentive to play up the landowner-tenant divide to maximise their 
support in national elections.  Not surprisingly, land issues with divisive politics surface 
regularly during political strife.  The system of incentives explains the prevalence of 
ethnically based politics, which is in essence a landowner-tenant struggle: a struggle given 
impetus via subsidies through the sugar protocol of the EU.  The above describes the deep 
causes of ethnically based competition in Fiji.  The Westminster form of government with its 
adversarial politics and an ethically based electoral system reinforce this divide.12  Rents have 
been dissipated in ‘wars of attrition’ between the two ethnic groups, leading to an outcome 
akin to that of a Prisoner’s dilemma game as shown next. 
 
4. The Analytical Framework 
For tractability, assume that the NLTB has sole authority to make land available for sugarcane 
farming.  Furthermore, let the Growers’ Union be the sole representative of the smallholder 
sugarcane-growing sector.  Rents are provided through subsidies to sugarcane production.  
We now have a duopoly that competes over the subsidy.  Let the date of expiry of land leases 
                                                 
12 The 1997 constitution was an attempt to bridge this gap through electoral engineering, but the outcomes of the 
1999 elections is evidence that this was unsuccessful. 
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be an endogenous outcome of political competition.  More specifically, let the probability of 
lease renewal depend on the parliamentary process.  The structure of incentives is one leading 
to reinforcing cleavage formation.  The above characterises a duopolistic non-cooperative 
(Nash) game between the two ethnic groups.  This game is depicted in the pay-off matrix 
given in Table 3 below. 
 
The payoffs are hypothetical and only indicative of the relative magnitudes.  The two players 
are the Growers’ Union and the NLTB, with the pay-offs to each given in parenthesis.  As an 
example, if the two players choose to cooperate by equally sharing the rents, then each gets a 
payoff of 3 as shown in the third row of column 3.  If, on the other hand, the Growers choose 
to cooperate while the NLTB decides to compete, then all rents (net of dissipation of 2 units) 
accrues to the latter.  The payoff in the bottom left cell is for the converse case, while the pay-
offs are nil for each when both compete, as all rents are lost to dissipation.  Note that in this 
game the joint pay-off of 6 (= 3+3) is maximised when both players co-operate while non-
cooperation leads to the worst possible outcome.  
 
Table 3: Pay-off Matrix for tenant-owner game 
  NLTB (on behalf of Landowners) 
  Co-operate Compete 
Co-operate (3,3) (0, 4) Growers’ Union 
(on behalf of tenants) Compete (4, 0) (0,0) 
 
The Nash-outcome, given by the bottom far right-hand cell with a nil payoff to both players, 
is discussed next.  A rent-seeking monopoly claims the presence of rents to justify its own 
existence.  The monopoly, however, has the incentive to retain all rents given the competitive 
nature of its franchisees.  The political leadership that draws support from an ethnically based 
electorate has the same incentive in maintaining the monopoly.  One would therefore expect 
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the NLTB to be highly politicised, legitimising its existence in a competitive framework as an 
agency for extracting rents from the competing party.  The above presupposes the existence of 
rents to begin with and the NLTB has an incentive to exaggerate the existence of high profits 
earned by the ethnic-Indian farmers.  The above explains why a study such as Davies and 
Gallimore (1999), supporting the presence of rents, would be popular amongst the indigenous 
(landowner) leadership while those challenging such a view, as did Kurer (2001), would 
largely be ignored.   
 
The Growers’ Union, as the representative of the tenants, has the incentive to convince 
tenants that lease-renewals is a function of the political process.  That is, the Union loses its 
legitimacy should lease-renewals become independent of the political process.  The Growers’ 
Union is funded via levies (in contrast to the NLTB), and thus its existence depends on 
continuing political support.  Such support, moreover, is critical for parliamentary seats 
allocated within the sugarcane growing districts on communal votes; the politicisation of the 
industry on the part of the Indians is thus least surprising.  The presence of the NLTB, opaque 
rules and political bargaining on lease renewals, and a communal voting-system provide the 
necessary preconditions for the duopolistic competition depicted in table 3 above. 
 
The game theoretic framework used above makes a number of simplifying assumptions.  This 
highly stylised representation of the land and sugar issues in Fiji, however, generates a 
number of predictions that are consistent with reality.  The analysis, for example, provides the 
basis for ethnically based and highly divisive politics in the country.  Of note is the fact that 
changing the electoral rules to induce cross-cutting cleavages, as was attempted under the 
1997 Constitution, was unsuccessful in ameliorating the ethnically divisive politics; possibly 
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because it failed to address the deep roots of such competition.13  In many respects, the 
competition between the landowners (capitalists) and tenants (labour) in Fiji is not too 
dissimilar to those seen elsewhere.  The game theoretic framework used above, importantly, 
enables us to suggest remedies both in terms of improving access to land and in facilitating 
adjustment to the loss of subsidies.  One clear implication from the above analysis is that 
sugar-subsidies have encouraged rent-seeking behaviour, thus the erosion of trade preferences 
will reduce such socially harmful competition. 
 
5. Improving access to communally owned land 
An efficiently operating market allowing access to land on the basis of a transparent and 
enforceable system of rules is critical for investment and growth in the broader economy (see 
de Soto, 2000 and World Bank, 2003).  The market for land requires regulation.  This is so for 
three reasons: first, due to the high costs and large economies of scale of the institutional 
infrastructure needed to establish and maintain land rights; second, to allow for common 
standards and maintenance of records to enable impersonal exchange of land rights; and third, 
to minimise costs of enforcement of property rights (see World Bank, 2003).  An efficiently 
operating market facilitating access to land induces (long-term) investment, whereas a failing 
market can be a barrier to growth of the entire economic system.  The costs of land conflicts, 
moreover, are disproportionately borne by the poor (World Bank, 2003: xv) and have the 
potential to escalate into civil wars as demonstrated by the recent experience of Solomon 
Islands.  Such ‘externalities’ justify public sector participation in securing property rights to 
land.  We draw on the long-established systems for financial intermediation to think about 
facilitating secure, possibly long-term, access to communally owned land.  It may be 
instructive to think of land as a fixed deposit, but with one major difference; land has spatial 
identity. 
                                                 
13 The 1997 Constitution can be seen as an attempt at imbedding the above game within a super-game with pay-
offs to force the cooperative outcome; with the benefit of hindsight of the 1999 elections, this proved not to be 
the case. 
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 Accepting the need for a regulator to facilitate access to communally owned land, we consider 
how the existing system could be reformed.  One sensible path to follow would be to 
unbundle the relevant components of NLTB into a Land Regulatory Authority (LRA) and a 
component responsible for intermediation of land between landowners and tenants.  The 
component responsible for intermediation could be outsourced to the competitive private 
sector.  The regulator would serve an analogous function to a Central Bank regarding 
supervision of the private sector intermediaries and in providing the regulatory framework for 
the efficient operation of the land-access market.  More specifically, the role of the regulator 
would be in formulating rules regarding the operation of the market that facilitates access to 
land.  The regulator would have to operate strictly at arms length from lessees and lessors.  
Regulation would include the facility to register land by any individual or group of 
individuals and in making available the use of such an asset for any length of time. 14   
 
Traditional landowners, for example, could be allowed to register their land either 
individually or jointly (via the i-tokatoka or matagali). 15  The existing parts of NLTB 
currently providing land-intermediation services could be broken up, possibly by provinces, 
and handed over to the provincial authorities.  Land, much like fixed deposits, could then be 
made available for use for any period of time, subject to the prevailing regulations.  The 
intermediary with appropriate regulatory supervision would have to guarantee that the leased 
land would revert back to the owner on the expiry of the lease.  Payments for using the land 
would be a matter to be determined between the landowner and the tenant.  Contracts would 
have to be drawn up, within the broad guidelines set by the regulator, and registered with the 
LRA such that a central repository of information on property rights is created and 
                                                 
14 The UCV is maximised with a perpetual lease.  That is, the UCV for a piece of land that generates rent (super-
normal profit) of one unit each year equals 1/r[1-e-rT], where r and T are the discount rate and the length of the 
lease, respectively.   
15 The hierarchy of the indigenous social groupings has as its apex the vanua with the following breakdown as 
one progresses down the pyramid: yavusa; mataqali; and, tokatoka.  This characterisation was made uniform via 
the colonial authorities in preparation for land registrations in 1896 (see Ward, 1995: 202). 
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maintained.  The pay-off matrix between the tenant and the landowner would now look very 
different.  Both will now be induced to cooperate in using any under-utilised resource for 
mutual gain.  The intermediation services, moreover, are similar to that provided by real estate 
agents in respect of rental accommodation for housing within the major urban centres.  
Payments for such use could be made as a lump sum, over time, as a combination of the two, 
or even with a financial instrument that matches the demands of the individual clients. 
 
A system of the kind proposed above has several advantages over the existing system.  First, 
it devolves decision making on access to communally owned land to the individual owners 
and investors, but within a regulated system.  Second, it permits leases of whatever length to 
be traded on the market with a price determined via forces of supply and demand.  Third, it 
brings in competition over land-intermediation, thus encouraging mutually beneficial 
exchange between landowners and investors, as opposed to the prisoner’s dilemma outcome 
of table 3 above.  As an example, a landowner may act strategically in giving secure long-
term access to a small parcel of their land in order to raise the value of the surrounding land.  
Such a scheme has been used relatively successfully in availing land for a major tourist 
development on Denerau Island.  The system proposed above, moreover, will also erode 
incentives for ethnically based politics in Fiji.  We next consider reforms to the smallholder 
sugarcane sector given impending withdrawal of EU subsidies. 
 
6. Facilitating adjustment to erosion of sugar subsidies from the EU 
Each smallholder producing sugarcane has a supply-contract with the FSC in the form of a 
Farm Basic Allotment (FBA); as of 2002, the aggregate FBA stood at 4.08 million tons of 
sugar cane.  As the first step in preparation for restructure of the sugar industry, the FBA 
should be assigned a property right.  The value of the FBA can be deduced under the 
following assumptions.  Let’s assume that the preferences will fall in two steps: first, by 30 
percent in 2007; and second, be removed altogether by the end of 2014.  Under the above 
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assumptions, we can calculate the value of subsidy implicit in each ton of sugar.  Imagine a 
situation where the subsidy implicit in sugar exports is paid lump sum as aid from the EU.  
The funds could then be used to purchase the FBA of individual farmers, thus creating a 
market for the asset created via the trade preference. 
 
Let’s use an illustrative case to demonstrate how such a market would work in practice.  
Assume that under current levels of subsidy, sugarcane is priced at F$50 per ton.  The 
assumptions regarding stepwise erosion of subsidies implies that this price will fall to F$35 
per ton from 2008, and decline to the subsidy-free price of F$17 per ton by the beginning of 
2015.  Assuming a discount rate of 5 percent, the net present value of subsidies implicit in 
each ton of FBA for the life of the Sugar Protocol is F$180.  Thus, on the basis of these 
assumptions, each ton of FBA as of the beginning of 2005 is worth F$180.  Of this, $10.80 
would accrue to landowners as their share of the proceeds on the assumption that land rents 
amount to 6 percent of the capitalised value of the subsidies. 
 
A voluntary restructure of the industry could be induced via the purchase of the FBAs from 
smallholders funded by a lump-sum transfer of aid (decoupled from sugar production) from 
the EU.  Farmers would have the following options: selling their FBA and exiting the 
industry; selling their FBA but remaining in the industry and selling their cane at the subsidy-
free price; or remaining in the industry and enjoying the preferential price until it expires.  
These decisions could be left to the individual farmer, but they would be provided with full 
information on future sugar prices and the rationale for the purchase of the FBAs. 
 
We can calculate the financial incentives facing farmers for each of the options listed above.  
Using the cash flow calculations provided in table 4 of Kurer (2001), the average farmer 
producing 160 tons of sugarcane would have the option of cashing his/her FBA for $27,072 
(that is, 160 tons x $169.20 per ton), followed by the option of remaining in the industry and 
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facing the subsidy-free price of $17 per ton, or exiting the industry altogether.16  If this farmer 
invests this lump sum with the Fiji National Provident Fund, his/her cash income at an annual 
return of 7 percent would amount to $1,895; should he decide to invest the amount in 15-year 
government bonds, the return at 5 percent would amount to an annual income of $1,354; and, 
a fixed deposit with the commercial banks with a return of 3 percent would yield an annual 
income of $813.  The annual income from investing the sugar-rents in these ways range from 
234 percent to 100 percent of the annual cash income of $862 earned by the farmer as 
reported in Kurer (2001).17  The financial incentives facing the farmer clearly favour selling 
the FBA and as soon as practical; the latter given the fact that the value of the FBA 
diminishes over time.  The landowner, moreover, will continue to be paid land-rents; this will 
now be based on the revised UCV that in turn will depend on how efficiently the land is used.  
Demands for improved efficiency in land use will induce rationalisation within the 
smallholder sector.  The revised UCV, however, will at least equal the old UCV less the 
capitalised value of rents, thus landowners cannot lose financially from the sale of the FBA. 
 
Let’s address some of the potential difficulties associated with the above strategy.  First, will 
this mean the decimation of the industry?  Probably not, as the farms on the alluvial plains 
close to the mills will still find it profitable to grow sugarcane at the subsidy-free price.  Even 
if it does mean a substantial reduction of the industry, as in a worst-case scenario, this should 
not be of concern since the income earned from the land can remain healthy (that is, “sweet”) 
without relying on sugar.  Next, will the EU pay the aid implicit in the sugar protocol as a 
lump sum?  Once again, this is an issue for negotiation between the authorities, but such a 
request would be consistent with the WTO agenda and the EU Economic Partnership 
Agreements that encourage assistance with adjustment.  If the EU is willing to provide aid via 
                                                 
16 These payments would accrue to farms with leases up to 2014; leases expiring earlier than 2014 would have 
the payments to the stakeholders mimic what happens implicitly under the current system. 
17 Kurer (2001) in arriving at this figure does not include transportation costs and those attributed to supply of 
domestic labour; land rents and debt-servicing costs are factored in his calculations, however. 
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trade, then it is hard to argue against continuing with the transfer as a one-off, lump sum 
payment to facilitate adjustment.  If the EU is unwilling to oblige, a request for assistance 
could be made to the international agencies. 
 
How about the workers in the industry who will be made redundant?  Given that the rents 
from preferential access to the EU are divided between the manufacturer and the grower 
according to a set formula, a similar scheme to that for the grower can be devised for workers 
made redundant as the industry is forced to rationalise.  What would be the political 
ramifications of paying out large sums of money to a select group of farmers?  This could be 
tricky, but there is precedence in the government providing taxpayer-funded grants to farmers 
exiting the industry as well as landowners commencing sugarcane farming.18  The challenge 
for the leaders, and policymakers, would be to fully explain the logic for such a transfer as it 
is akin to making a fully-funded redundancy payout to farmers opting out of subsidised 
production for good. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The expiry of land leases on which sugar cane has been grown has brought to a head the 
challenges of facilitating secure long term access to land.  Doing so is particularly critical as a 
healthy market for secure and long-term access to land has implications for investment and 
growth of production in the broader economy.  The impending erosion of preferences to sugar 
exports to the EU as world trade is liberalised has increased the urgency for deciding on 
policies relating to adjustments to such a large shock.  Much of the popular discussion has 
tried to address the issues regarding facilitating long-term access to land in the same breath as 
meeting the adjustment challenges posed by the erosion of sugar subsidies.  This paper argues 
that these two, albeit related, are separate issues deserving their own distinct solutions.  The 
                                                 
18 The Peoples Coalition Government provided $28,000 rehabilitation grants to displaced farmers, while the SDL 
Government has been providing $10,000 grants to landowners entering the industry. 
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issue of facilitating long-term secure access to land is a long-term challenge; the resolution of 
which necessitates building upon the success of the existing mechanisms, the Native Land 
Trust Board arrangements in particular.  The issue of facilitating adjustment to the erosion of 
preferential access to sugar into the EU is a short-term challenge and one that is likely to be 
painful due to the forced rationalisation; but one way or another this problem will be resolved 
in the next 14 years or so.   
 
By subsidising resettlement of landowners on sugarcane farms vacated by tenants on the 
expiry of leases, policymakers have encouraged entry into a declining industry.  This will 
exacerbate the pains of adjustment as EU subsidies delivered through the payment of 
preferential prices for Fijian sugar exports are withdrawn.  There is the distinct possibility that 
the newly settled growers will undergo an unnecessary round of adjustment pains as the price 
of sugarcane falls.  The prospective erosion of subsidies paid for sugar sold to the EU is 
already placing severe demands on efficiency and productivity, both in growing the sugarcane 
and in milling the crop.  Placing these demands on new growers is only likely to lead to even 
greater distress. 
 
This paper suggests interventions to facilitate long-term and secure access to communally 
owned land.  We argue for the creation of a regulatory agency charged with the responsibility 
of providing arms-length supervision of a market driven process that allows landowners to 
make their land available to investors.  The model followed here is akin to that of financial 
intermediation where banks take fixed deposits, which is on-lent to investors for use on 
agreed terms and prices and under conditions of certainty.  Such a system is likely to induce 
cooperation between the owners of land and those with the capital to make the most 
productive use of the asset.  Private sector intermediaries make the market while the regulator 
ensures prudential supervision to avoid problems in the market spilling over to the rest of the 
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economy.  Achieving the above is a long-term challenge and one likely to impact on the rate 
of investment and growth of the economy. 
 
Facilitating adjustment to the loss of preferential access into the EU, in contrast, is a short-
term challenge.  The Fijian economy would have to adjust, possibly very painfully, if nothing 
is done to ease such pains as the preferential price is reduced.  The solution proposed here is 
relatively clean in terms of economic efficiency, though the political expediency of such a 
solution is hard to gauge.  We propose that the aid implicit in sugar subsidies from the EU be 
‘decoupled from production’ and provided lump sum.  This amount could then be used to 
purchase the sugarcane supply-contracts (that is, the farm based allotments) from the 
smallholder sector.  Using an illustrative example, we show that farmers, in all likelihood, 
will happily sell their farm based allotments on purely financially considerations.  A similar 
mechanism could be used to rationalise the milling sector by paying off workers made 
redundant from the rationalisation of the industry.  This proposal facilitates rapid adjustment, 
the participation of the stakeholders is totally voluntary, and the proposal is fully funded and 
consistent with WTO rules.  This proposal has applicability beyond Fiji, particularly for 
adjustment in industries supported by preferential access into foreign country markets. 
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 Table 1: Sugar Production Statistics, 1971-2002. 
Year No of 
Contracts 
Area 
Harvested 
(‘000 ha) 
Production 
(000 t) 
Sugar 
Production
(000 t) 
1971 15548 47 2545 323 
1972 15612 44 2238 303 
1973 16533 46 2496 301 
1974 16546 45 2151 272 
1975 17264 45 2160 264 
1976 17667 47 2283 286 
1977 18395 52 2674 362 
1978 18456 54 2853 347 
1979 19152 62 4063 473 
1980 19700 66 3360 396 
1981 21000 66 3931 470 
1982 21574 69 4075 487 
1983 21880 59 2203 276 
1984 22130 69 4290 480 
1985 22159 70 3042 341 
1986 22182 69 4109 502 
1987 22255 66 2960 401 
1988 22127 64 3185 363 
1989 21771 71 4099 461 
1990 21334 70 4016 408 
1991 24479 73 3380 389 
1992 23334 73 3533 426 
1993 23454 74 3704 442 
1994 23264 74 4064 517 
1995 22449 74 4110 454 
1996 22304 74 4380 454 
1997 22100 73 3280 347 
1998 22146 57 2098 266 
1999 22178 65 3958 377 
2000 22179 63 3786 341 
2001 21882 66 2805 293 
2002 21246 65 3423 330 
Source: Current Economic Statistics Bulletin, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, (June 2003 & January, 
1990) 
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Table 2: Expiry of sugarcane farm leases in Fiji, 1997-2005 
Year of expiry 
 
Indo-Fijian leases 
 
All cane leases 
 
 No.  Area (ha) No. Area (ha) 
1997 27 232 27 232 
1998 120 1,398 128 1,463 
1999 158 1,708 170 1,962 
2000 1,133 8,217 1,218 8,838 
2001 1,494 7,861 1,542 8,337 
2002 310 2,670 322 2,912 
2003 435 2,945 465 3,240 
2004 216 2,250 231 2,390 
2005 228 2,297 245 2,490 
Source: Reddy and Naidu, 2001: 34. 
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 Appendix 
Table A1: Basic statistics on variables modelled; sample period, 1971 to 2002 
Variable(s) Sugar price 
(Current $F) 
Cane price 
(Current $F) 
Area  
(‘000 hectares) 
TCTS 
(ratio) 
Maximum 1031.0 81.79 74 11.1 
Minimum 97 7.95 44 7.38 
Mean 460.78 37.74 62.78 8.65 
Coefficient Of 
Variation (%) 
48 44 16 11 
 
Table A2: Correlation Matrix of Variables 
 Sugar Price Cane Price Area TCTS 
Sugar Price 1.000    
Cane Price 0.85985 1.000   
Area 0.5234 0.6291 1.000  
TCTS 0.58234 0.55984 0.42913 1.000 
 
Table A2: Model estimates for milling efficiency to sugar price (dependent variable: log tcts). 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 1.54** 
(9.41) 
1.47** 
(9.22) 
1.27** 
(3.33) 
2.09** 
(4.03) 
Log(Sugar price) 0.10** 
(3.75) 
 0.083** 
(2.28) 
 
Log (Sugar pricet-1)  0.11** 
(4.31) 
 0.19 
(0.31) 
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Log (Area)   0.092 
(0.78) 
-0.34 
(-0.73) 
Time trend No No No Yes 
     
# of obs. 32 31 32 31 
Adj. R-squared 0.30 0.37 0.29 0.40 
DW-statistic 1.68 1.51 1.56 1.78 
Notes: t-ratios are given in parenthesis; ** denotes the coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant at 5 percent level of significance; and tcts is tons of cane to ton of sugar.  Given 
the small number of observations, care has to be taken in interpreting the results above.  The 
errors generated from each of the models were diagnosed for problems of misspecification, 
autocorrelation, joint-significance of parameter estimates, etc.  The plot of error terms from 
Model 1, the preferred model, is give below. 
 
Figure A1: Plot of residuals and two standard error bands from Model 1. 
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